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Abstract 
 
With data from 2001 to 2010 of the First Instance Courts of the Canton of Ticino, Switzerland, this 
paper examines the impact of Legge sull’istituzione della Pretura penale e della funzione di 
sostituto Procuratore pubblico (2002), which meant to improve Cantonal court performance by 
decreasing penal workload. Our results suggest that such law has posed non-positive effects on 
judicial length and courts’ performance. This work may furnish moreover some intuition about the 
expected impact of Legge sull’organizzazione giudiziaria (2006), which has adapted cantonal 
judicial system to new Swiss Civil Procedure Code, as well policy proposals for the cantonal 
programme known as Giustizia 2018. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Judicial systems serve important purposes not only in upholding social values but also in determining 
economic performance. Well-functioning judiciaries guarantee the security of property rights and the 
enforcement of contracts, as well as significantly impact on the cost of borrowing loans (Bae and Goyal, 
2009; Laeven and Majnoni, 2005). The security of property rights reinforces incentives to save and invest by 
protecting returns on these activities and, in turn, raising the national GDP (Bianco et al., 2002; Djankov et 
al., 2008). The good enforcement of contracts stimulates agents to enter into economic relationships by 
discouraging opportunistic behaviour and reducing transaction costs. Such circumstances positively impact 
on growth through various channels; they promote competition, foster specialisation in more innovative 
industries, and contribute to the development of financial and credit markets. Furthermore, judicial systems 
are significantly related to entrepreneurship (Ardagna and Lusardi, 2008; Ippoliti et al., 2014) and firm 
growth (Beck et al., 2006; Kumar et al., 2001).  
 
The judiciary organisation in the Canton of Ticino, Switzerland, has been modified during last years, and 
further reforms are expected. Accordingly, Ticino has promoted the programme known as Giustizia 2018, 
which has prompted much research on judiciary organisation. The analysis in this paper follows the long 
tradition of the scientific study of judiciary efficiency at the international level (e.g. the case of European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, CEPEJ
3
) by focusing on quantitative data from 2001 to 2010 on 
the Cantonal judicial system.  
 
In Ticino, the first instance level of the cantonal judicial system consists of judges of the peace and 10 first 
instance courts (FICs); each FIC is called pretura.
4
 Judges of the peace are competent for any case of a value 
less than a certain threshold (the current threshold is 5,000 CHF), while FICs are competent for cases of all 
higher values, as well as other specific competences (e.g., rent and eviction). By name, Ticino’s 10 FICs are 
Mendrisio Sud, Mendrisio Nord, Bellinzona, Lugano, Locarno Città, Locarno Campagna, Vallemaggia, 
Riviera, Leventina, and Blenio. All of these courts but Lugano contain one judge (Pretore) and one staff unit 
(segretario assessore). The FIC of Lugano involves six sections, each with a specific competence, and six 
pretore. 
 
While, except for relevant cases, there is in Switzerland a general dearth of empirical and theoretical findings 
on the mode of operation of the justice system (Lienhard and Kettiger, 2009, 2010; Lienhard et al., 2012; 
Meier, 1999), several approaches for measuring judiciary efficiency have been proposed in the US and EU: 
the time needed to define a case (Christensen and Szmer, 2012; Di Vita, 2010; Djankov et al., 2003; 
Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2007), technical efficiency scores (Falavigna et al., 2014; Ippoliti et al., 2014; 
Santos and Amado, 2014), the number of cases completed in the court (Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2004; 
Ramseyer, 2012), and the clearance rate (Buscaglia and Ulen, 1997; CEPEJ, 2012; Dakolias, 1999; Soares 
and Sviatschi, 2010). In the present study, two measures of judicial efficiency are used: clearance rate and 
disposition time. Clearance rate indicates whether courts have kept pace with the quantity of incoming cases 
without increasing their backlog, whereas disposition time refers to the time needed to bring a case to its 
close. 
 
By analysing Cantonal courts’ clearance rates and disposition times, this paper seeks to contribute a 
quantitative estimation of both the performance of Ticino’s FICs from 2001 to 2010 and a primary judicial 
reform enacted in the Canton: Legge sull’istituzione della Pretura penale e della funzione di sostituto 
Procuratore pubblico (LexPP). Specifically, in 2002, LexPP instituted a central penal Court in Bellinzona, 
which implied that FICs were exempted from handling penal cases, but that judges of the four smallest FICs 
                                                          
3 CEPEJ was founded by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in September 2002 in order both to assess the 
efficiency of judicial systems and to propose practical tools and measures to continually improve the efficiency of judicial services 
offered to EU citizens.  
4 At the second instance level there is a Cantonal appeal court (i.e., Tribunale d'Appello) and, at the third instance level, there is a 
Federal court (i.e., Tribunale Federale). 
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(i.e., Vallemaggia, Riviera, Leventina, and Blenio) had to work at once in both Bellinzona’s central penal 
court and their respective FICs.  
 
The results of this analysis can suggest, furthermore, some of the expected results of a successive reform, 
Legge sull’organizzazione giudiziaria (LOG), which has been issued in 2006, but with significant changes 
only after 2010. Indeed, in 2011, LOG set new thresholds: The competence of judges of the peace rose from 
2,000 to 5,000 CHF, meaning that these judges would hear all cases less than 5,000 CHF in value; at the 
same time, the threshold for non-appealable cases rose from 8,000 to 10,000 CHF, which decreased the 
workload for higher courts. This change was a consequence of Article 308 of new Swiss Civil Procedure 
Code (CPC) reformed in 2008. LOG also instituted a new type of judge—pretore aggiunto—to assist in 
completing the activities of the pretore and to thus reduce the backlog (articles 32-37).
5
 Also in this case the 
position became institutionalised only after 2010, by a new law (Legge di applicazione del codice di diritto 
processuale civile svizzero del 24/6/2010). 
 
What is the impact of the LexPP on the performance of FICs? And, what are the expected consequences of 
LOG? To discuss the effects of the cantonal reform in Ticino (LexPP) and to indicate the expected impact of 
the successive reform (LOG),
 6
 the remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to 
the motivation of this work, illustrating the expected impacts of both reforms. Section 3 presents the 
methodology to measure judicial efficiency and reports relevant descriptive statistics. Section 4 shows in 
detail the empirical models used in this study. In Section 4, we explain and discuss our results while, in 
Section 6, we suggest some policy implication. 
 
 
 
2. Motivation 
 
Though LexPP implied that FICs were exempted from handling penal cases, judges of the four smallest FICs 
(i.e., Vallemaggia, Riviera, Leventina, and Blenio) had to work in both this central penal court and their 
respective FICs at the same time. LexPP was expected, on the one hand, to reduce the clearance rate and 
increase the disposition time of the four smallest FICs, since pretore of these FICs are involved in two 
different courts with increased workloads. On the other hand, since the new penal court judges exempted 
FICs from all penal cases, LexPP should have improved both the clearance rate and disposition time of other 
FICs by reducing their workloads.  
 
As abovementioned, LOG defined new thresholds: The competence of judges of peace rose from 2,000 to 
5,000 CHF, while the threshold for non-appealable cases rose from 8,000 to 10,000 CHF, the latter of which 
was a consequence of Article 308 of new CPC. As a reform, LOG is expected to reduce FICs workload and 
consequently improve their clearance rates and disposition times, since competences transferred cases from 
FICs to judges of peace. It will also expect to decrease the workload of the second instance courts as a 
consequence of the higher threshold for non-appealable cases. Moreover taking the new personnel into 
account (i.e. Pretore Aggiunto), there might be another reduction of workload for every judge. 
 
Figure 1 shows a flowchart that summarises the primary actions of LexPP and LOG and the expected 
consequences. Observing the figure, readers can better understand the common feature of both reforms, i.e. 
the reduction of workload to improve FICs performance.  
 
 
                                                          
5 There are four pretori aggiunti in the court of Lugano, two in Bellinzona, and one each in Mendrisio Nord, Mendrisio Sud, Locarno 
Città, and Locarno Campagna. No pretore aggiunto is introduced in the smallest courts (i.e., Vallemaggia, Riviera, Blenio, and 
Leventina).  
6 Authors are clearly affected by data availability and, therefore, they cannot estimate directly the real impact of LOG reform. 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of judicial reforms in Ticino 
 
However, in order to confirm, or not, the expected results of the policy maker, an empirical analysis is 
necessary, taking all determinants of judicial efficiency into account.   
 
 
 
3. Data, methodology and descriptive statistics of the Cantonal judicial system in Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
In the present study, two measures of judicial efficiency are used: clearance rate and disposition time. 
Clearance rate indicates whether courts have kept pace with the quantity of incoming cases without 
increasing their backlog, whereas disposition time refers to the time needed to bring a case to its close.
7
 The 
clearance rate is the relationship between the new cases and completed cases within a period. More 
specifically, the clearance rate equals the number of resolved cases divided by the number of incoming ones: 
 
              
   
  
              
   
              
   
 
where i represents the i-th FIC of Ticino at the year t.  
 
                                                          
7 An exposition of indexes is offered at the following Counsel of Europe’s website: 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1389931&Site=COE (last access: 22 September 2014).  
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A clearance rate greater than 1 indicates that the Court has satisfied the flow of the demand for justice and 
decreased the backlog from the previous year, whereas a rate less than 1 indicates that the court has not 
satisfied the demand for justice and that its backlog has increased. For instance, if in a calendar year 500 new 
cases were submitted to the court, and the court completed at the same time 550 cases, the clearance rate is 
1.10. If the court would complete 400 cases, the clearance rate would be 0.8.  
 
The disposition time is based on the fundamental judicial principle that each case receives a fair trial within a 
reasonable time (Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights). This principle must be fully 
enacted when managing court workload,
8
 despite concerns of proceedings duration and specific measures to 
reduce such duration. According to CEPEJ, disposition time refers to the number of unresolved cases during 
any period divided by the number of resolved cases at the end of the same period, multiplied by 365 (i.e., the 
number of days in the considered period), generating data concerning the estimated time that is needed to 
bring a case to an end:  
 
 
                
   
     
                
   
              
   
 
where i represents the i-th FIC of Ticino at the year t.  
 
The ratio measures how quickly the judicial system turns over received cases – that is, how long it takes for a 
type of cases to be resolved. This indicator provides further insight into how a judicial system manages its 
flow of cases (CEPEJ, 2012).
9
 
 
Data used in this paper are taken from the annual report of the cantonal judicial system (Rendiconto del 
Consiglio di Stato).
10
 These data refer to the period from 2001 to 2010. In accordance with the judicial 
classification, we can separate among appealable civil cases, non-appealable civil cases, executions and 
bankruptcy cases. The difference between appealable and non-appealable cases is based, among other things, 
on the value of the cases and the opportunity to propose, or not, an appeal at the second instance level. For 
executions and bankruptcies, data available are ones referring (only) to the cases of the opposition to the 
rejection. Moreover, data are distinguished between cases concluded by Judge’s decision and cases 
concluded by alternative methods such as the withdrawal of a party or a settlement. The report of the 
cantonal judicial system offers, finally, the number of pending civil cases at the beginning and the end of 
each year, as well as the number of incoming cases.  
 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for each FIC of Ticino from 2001 to 2010. In details, the third 
column indicates the average number of cases resolved each year. Though the distribution among FICs is 
highly irregular, FICs in Ticino resolve on average more than 7,000 cases per year. Table 1 also shows the 
percentage of civil cases concluded by Judge’s decision, as opposed to being concluded by alternative 
methods such as the withdrawal of a party or a settlement. For Table 1, it should be noted that the percentage 
of cases resolved by a Judge’s decision is 52% in Blenio, though the cantonal average is 64%, with the 
highest value in Lugano (68%). Differences based on conclusions may also be relevant since cases 
concluded by Judge’s decisions tend to take longer than cases concluded by other means such as an 
agreement between the parties.  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Workload refers to the number of cases pending at the beginning of each year added to the number of cases incoming during the 
year.  
9 Note that, even if the formula offers valuable information on the estimated length of proceedings, the ratio does not provide a clear 
estimate of the average time needed to process each case and it fails to indicate the mix, concentration, or validity of the cases.  
10  Data are available at the following link: http://www4.ti.ch/poteri/giudiziario/consiglio-della-magistratura/rendiconti-annuali/ (last 
access: 25 August 2014). 
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Table 1. Descriptive average statistics of Ticino, 2001–2010  
 
Pretura Population Cases 
  Total 
solved 
By 
Judge’s 
decision 
Appealable 
(Non-appealable) 
Executions and 
bankruptcies 
Pending 
on 1/1 
Incoming Pending 
on 12/31 
Bellinzona 46,236 813.30 59% 50% (10%) 40% 486.10 820.20 493.00 
Blenio 5,602 72.90 52% 46% (11%) 43% 57.00 72.80 56.90 
Leventina 9,930 105.90 54% 48% (8%) 44% 63.30 105.00 62.40 
Locarno Campagna 41,973 609.10 60% 47% (11%) 42% 307.20 601.80 299.90 
Locarno Città 18,350 420.00 57% 48% (10%) 42% 260.90 411.00 251.90 
Lugano 136,485 3,731.60 68% 40% (11%) 49% 2,348.10 3,749.70 2,366.20 
Mendrisio Nord 8,910 505.00 61% 45% (10%) 45% 331.80 493.90 320.70 
Mendrisio Sud 38,822 552.10 64% 44% (11%) 45% 393.60 540.50 382.00 
Riviera 12,076 255.90 54% 42% (9%) 49% 164.20 254.70 163.00 
Vallemaggia 5,787 63.80 55% 44% (13%) 43% 26.50 64.70 27.40 
Ticino 324,170 7,129.60 64% 43% (11%) 46% 4,438.70 7,114.30 4,423.40 
 
Moreover, on average, 43% of the workload represents appealable cases, 11% represents non-appealable 
cases, and the remaining 46% represents executions and bankruptcy cases. It should be noted that the FIC of 
Bellinzona differs significantly from the other courts, as it shows the highest percentage of appealable civil 
cases (50%) and the lowest percentage of executions and bankruptcies (40%).  
 
Table 1 also presents the number of pending civil cases at the beginning and at the end of each year, as well 
as the number of incoming cases. Such figures allow us to define the demand for civil justice (i.e., the 
number of pending civil cases at the beginning of each year and the number of incoming cases during the 
year), the supply of civil justice (i.e., the number of resolved cases during the year), and the backlog (i.e., the 
number of pending cases at the end of each year)—all of which are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive average statistics for Ticino, 2001–2010  
 
Pretura Demand for justice Supply of justice Backlog 
Bellinzona 1,306.3 813.3 493 
Blenio 129.8 72.9 56.9 
Leventina 168.3 105.9 62.4 
Locarno Campagna 909 609.1 299.9 
Locarno Città 671.9 420 251.9 
Lugano 6,097.8 3,731.6 2,366.2 
Mendrisio Nord 825.7 505 320.7 
Mendrisio Sud 934.1 552.1 382 
Riviera 418.9 255.9 163 
Vallemaggia 91.2 63.8 27.4 
Ticino 11,553 7,129.6 4,423.4 
 
In more detail, Table 3 shows that Ticino’s judicial system can satisfy the demand for justice (i.e., an average 
clearance rate of 1.010), though the trend is not constant. In fact, Ticino’s clearance rate was less than 1 in 
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three years (2003, 2004, and 2010), due to the poor performance of some FICs—particularly Lugano, which 
had to satisfy half of the total cantonal demand for justice.  
 
 
Table 3. Clearance rates in Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
Pretura 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean* 
Bellinzona 1.001 1.106 0.951 0.936 0.963 0.972 1.073 1.036 0.922 0.966 0.993 
Blenio 1.000 1.000 0.893 1.074 1.102 1.196 1.033 0.959 1.060 0.788 1.010 
Leventina 0.935 1.099 0.920 1.083 1.000 1.100 0.968 0.957 1.011 1.034 1.011 
Locarno Campagna 1.066 1.024 1.038 0.955 0.936 0.997 1.050 1.020 1.067 0.977 1.013 
Locarno Città 1.165 1.025 1.012 0.982 0.956 1.047 1.038 1.122 1.028 0.900 1.027 
Lugano 1.030 0.963 1.000 0.932 1.087 1.037 1.054 0.938 1.047 0.889 0.998 
Mendrisio Nord 1.061 0.971 1.049 1.027 0.978 0.909 1.053 1.130 1.168 0.917 1.026 
Mendrisio Sud 1.087 1.090 1.028 0.855 1.223 1.023 1.004 0.988 0.998 0.925 1.022 
Riviera 1.008 1.034 1.039 0.852 0.919 1.060 1.038 1.128 0.941 1.157 1.017 
Vallemaggia 1.014 1.065 1.000 1.070 1.000 0.872 0.867 0.978 1.065 0.889 0.982 
Ticino 1.037 1.038 0.993 0.976 1.016 1.021 1.018 1.026 1.031 0.944 1.010 
*Average clearance rate accounts for the panel (2001–2010). 
 
Figure 2 shows the ranking of FICs according to average disposition time from 2001 to 2010. Blenio has the 
highest average disposition time. 
 
 
Figure 2. Descriptive statistics of disposition times at FICs in Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
Table 4. Disposition times in Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
Pretura 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean* 
Bellinzona 211 159 207 203 267 242 217 216 271 239 223 
Blenio 291 277 387 320 326 287 277 261 152 353 293 
Leventina 230 234 259 176 198 199 231 247 233 170 218 
Locarno Campagna 177 166 169 162 211 193 190 186 177 174 180 
Locarno Città 204 227 215 180 240 247 245 211 210 221 220 
Lugano 190 214 223 259 220 230 217 278 235 267 233 
Mendrisio Nord 263 327 249 151 275 282 239 220 169 210 238 
Mendrisio Sud 234 241 257 343 194 254 267 245 262 255 255 
Riviera 204 181 154 203 276 261 309 262 355 196 240 
Vallemaggia 137 127 118 86 144 223 232 142 177 254 164 
Ticino 214 215 224 208 235 242 242 227 224 234 227 
*Average disposition time accounts for the panel (2001–2010). 
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Table 4 presents a more detailed descriptive statistics of disposition times. The average disposition time in 
Ticino is about 227 days, though this average figure has shown an increasing trend. Moreover, if we consider 
a single court, the trend is not as constant.  
 
Table 5 proposes the disposition time and the clearance rate for each case-law, i.e. considering executions 
and bankruptcies, appealable and non-appealable cases. According to data, only in four FICs the clearance 
rate of executions and bankruptcies cases is higher than 1 (i.e. Locarno Città, Locarno Campagna, Riviera 
and Vallemaggia). It is worthy to underline that, though the time necessary to define an execution and 
bankruptcy case is estimated to be the lower (i.e. 73 days) than appealable (561 days) and non-appealable 
(246 days) cases, the clearance rate is lower in executions and bankruptcies (1.0003) than appealable 
(1.0396) and non-appealable (1.0495). It means that, though cases involving executions and bankruptcies are 
more rapid than appealable and non-appealable cases, the decreasing of workload in executions and 
bankruptcies is lower rapid than appealable and non-appealable cases.    
 
 
Table 5. Disposition times and clearance rate in Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
Preture 
Clearence rate Disposition time 
Appealable 
cases 
Non 
appealable 
cases 
Executions 
and 
bankruptcies Total 
Appealable 
cases 
Non 
appealable 
cases 
Executions 
and 
bankruptcies Total 
Bellinzona 0.9996 1.0052 0.9894 0.9926 612 189 34 223 
Blenio 1.1238 0.9904 0.9949 1.0104 639 391 108 293 
Leventina 1.0287 1.0670 0.9971 1.0107 568 256 55 218 
Locarno Campagna 1.0123 1.0695 1.0092 1.0130 404 156 51 180 
Locarno Città 1.0671 1.0986 1.0017 1.0275 484 247 68 220 
Lugano 1.0163 1.0240 0.9880 0.9976 638 236 84 233 
Mendrisio Nord 1.0740 1.1669 0.9948 1.0262 612 225 75 238 
Mendrisio Sud 1.0639 1.1163 0.9980 1.0221 670 312 80 255 
Riviera 1.0352 0.9946 1.0181 1.0174 646 200 99 240 
Vallemaggia 0.9745 0.9626 1.0121 0.9820 342 246 75 164 
Ticino 1.0396 1.0495 1.0003 1.0100 561 246 73 227 
 
Finally, the table 6 reports the average clearance rates and disposition times before and after the cantonal 
reform (LexPP).  
 
 
Table 6. Judicial system before and after LexPP reform in Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
 
Period 
Clearance  
rate 
Disposition 
times 
Workload  
(Appealable cases) 
Workload (Executions and 
bankruptcies) 
Total 
workload 
Before LexPP (2001–2002) 1.0373 224 0.4331 0.4514 1,236 
After LexPP (2003–2010) 1.0031 228 0.4575 0.4412 1,135 
Total (2001–2010) 1.0100 227 0.4526 0.4432 1,155 
 
According to these data, the average clearance rate from 2001 to 2002 was 1.0373, which decreased to 
1.0031 after LexPP. In terms of disposition time, the reform lengthened case duration. In this sense, LexPP 
does not seem to have improved FIC performance. However, it is necessary to analyse all determinants of 
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judicial efficiency together in order to correctly estimate and better understand the poor outcomes of the 
LexPP reform, since several causes might have each partly affected FIC performance. 
 
 
 
4. Empirical Model 
 
To explain cantonal judicial efficiency and the impact of LexPP and the expected consequences of LOG, we 
have accounted for the following variables:  
 
 Workload (executions and bankruptcies), which equals the percentage of such cases out of the total 
workload; note that we refer only to data of cases of the opposition to the rejection. 
 Workload (appealable cases), which equals the percentage of such cases out of the total workload;  
 Workload (non-appealable cases), which equals the percentage of such cases out of the total 
workload;  
 Index of resolved cases, which equals to the number of cases resolved in the court by a decision out of 
the number of cases resolved by alternative means; 
 LexPP, which is an ordinal categorical variable equal to 0 (for all courts before 2003), -1 (for courts 
with a judge who must work in the unique penal court in Bellinzona after 2003), and 1 (for courts with a 
judge who does not have to work in the unique penal court in Bellinzona after 2003); 
 Personnel rate, which equals the number of court workers (i.e., pretore and segretario assessore) per 
every 1,000 cases of workload. 
 
The empirical analysis proposed in this section is based on multiple regression models involving random 
effect, panel data, and robust option. Three models are proposed. 
 
Model 1 concerns the determinants of judicial efficiency and the impact of the law, as follows: 
 
Clearance_ratei,t = β0 + β1 Resolved_casesi,t + β2 Workload_Executionsi,t + β3 Personneli,t + β4 LexPPi,t + εi,t 
 
Disposition_timei,t = β0 + β1 Resolved_casesi,t + β2 Workload_Executionsi,t + β3 Personneli,t + β4 LexPPi,t + εi,t 
 
in which i represents the i-th FIC of Ticino at the year t, while ε the error.  
 
Since the three variables of appealable, non-appealable, and executions and bankruptcy cases are categorical 
variables, one must be dropped for collinearity, which is the base category against which the other(s) are 
assessed (Suits, 1957). The intercept of the model represents the omitted categories: the residual workload 
(appealable and non-appealable cases) and cases resolved by other means. 
 
To obtain more robust results, this analysis proposes two sub-models: Model A, which considers all cantonal 
courts, and Model B, which considers all courts but Lugano, since it represents more than half of the demand 
for justice, meaning that the performance of the total cantonal system might be unduly affected by this one 
court (Table 2). In both Models A and B, the Hausman test has been applied to verify whether the random 
effect is more appropriate than the fixed one (e.g., considering the clearance rate, the p-value in Model A is 
0.2135).
11
 To verify collinearity among variables, the pairwise correlation has been tested with acceptable 
values. 
 
                                                          
11 Authors didn’t find significant differences between fixed and random effects: both models confirm the same statistically significant 
coefficients and the estimated degree of the change between random effect and fixed effect is not relevant. 
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Table 7 presents the results of the Model 1 with clearance rate as the dependent variable. Both Models 1.1A 
and 1.1B are statistically significant (Wald test)
12
 with an acceptable R
2
. Considering the between R
2
, the 
variance of the dependent variable explained by the explanatory variables is 22.60% both in Model 1.1A and 
in Model 1.1B, while, considering the within R
2
, the variance is 14.19% in Model 1.1A and 14.22% in Model 
1.1B. These results are reasonable if we consider the heterogeneity of the sample, which is lower within the 
panel but higher among observations.  
 
 
Table 7. Multiple regression model involving panel data, random effect, and robust option for Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
 Mod. 1.1A Mod. 1.1B 
Variables Clearance rate Clearance rate 
   
Workload (executions and bankruptcy cases) -0.273** (0.126) -0.287** (0.133) 
Index resolved cases  -0.0374** (0.0151) -0.0434*** (0.0147) 
Personnel (per every 1,000 cases of workload) -0.00350*** (0.000748) -0.00355*** (0.000756) 
LexPP -0.0165* (0.00927) -0.0181* (0.00991) 
Constant 1.213*** (0.0635) 1.226*** (0.0649) 
   
R2   
Within  0.1419 0.1422 
Between  0.2260 0.2260 
Overall  0.1032 0.1032 
   
Wald test (4) 29.23 37.11 
Probability > chi-square  0.0000 0.0000 
   
Observations 100 90 
Number of FICs 10 9 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
Results suggest that increasing the percentage of executions and bankruptcy cases in the total workload 
decreases the clearance rate. In both Models 1.1A and 1.1B, the coefficients are statistically significant (p < 
0.05). This result is coherent with the data proposed in table 5. Indeed, table 5 shows that the clearance rate 
in this specific case law is significantly lower than the others, even if the time necessary to define a case is 
relatively low. Moreover, we find that increasing the number of cases resolved by Judge’s decision with 
respect the number resolved in other ways, courts performance will decrease (p < 0.05). Obviously, the effect 
of the dropped variables (i.e., the base categories against which the others are assessed) is represented by the 
intercept, which is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01).  
 
Considering personnel, this result suggests that the number of workers per every 1,000 cases negatively 
impacts the clearance rate, meaning that decreasing the workload or increasing the personnel will negatively 
impact court performance (p < 0.01). This is consistent with the literature since it suggests that decreasing 
the pressure on judges can decrease their productivity (Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2004). Indeed, since the 
number of staff and the number of judges did not change in the period, workload has affected court 
                                                          
12 The Wald test assesses the hypothesis that at least one of the predictors’ regression coefficients is not equal to zero. The number in 
the parentheses indicates the degrees of freedom of the chi-square distribution used to test the Wald test statistic and is defined by the 
number of predictors in the model.  
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productivity. As such, the results suggest that decreasing the workload and maintaining the same number of 
personnel, the court performance will decrease. 
 
 
Table 8. Multiple regression model involving panel data, random effect, and robust option for Ticino, 2001–2010 
 
 Mod. 1.2A Mod. 1.2B 
Variables Disposition times† Disposition times† 
   
Workload (executions and bankruptcy cases) -1.024 (0.904) -1.069 (0.955) 
Index resolved cases  0.192*** (0.0543) 0.190*** (0.0572) 
Personnel (per every 1,000 cases of workload) 0.00408 (0.00527) 0.00383 (0.00523) 
LexPP -0.00406 (0.0609) -0.0160 (0.0646) 
Constant 5.534*** (0.509) 5.560*** (0.538) 
   
R2   
Within  0.2067 0.2102 
Between  0.1220 0.1988 
Overall  0.0380 0.0347 
   
Wald test (4) 29.16 28.72 
Probability > chi-square  0.0000 0.0000 
   
Observations 100 90 
Number of FICs 10 9 
* p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
†Logarithmic transformation  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 8 shows the role of the LexPP with the disposition time as the dependent variable: Both Models 1.2A 
and 1.2B are statistically significant (Wald test) and have acceptable R
2
, taking the number of observations 
and variables into account. Considering the between R
2
, the variance of the dependent variable explained is 
12.20% in Model 1.2A and 19.88% in Model 1.2B, while, considering the within R
2
, the variance is 20.67% 
in Model 1.2A and 21.02% in Model 1.2B.  
 
Both models suggest that cases needing Judge’s decisions lengthen the time needed for courts to process 
cases more than cases decided by other means. This result is statistically significant (p < 0.01), though there 
are no other statistically significant results but the intercept of the model. This outcome might rely on 
litigation among parties, as well the opportunity to propose an appeal at the second instance courts. In this 
sense, the reduction of opportunity to propose an appeal at a second instance court as introduced by LOG 
(threshold for non-appealable cases rose from 8,000 to 10,000 CHF) might provide incentives to achieve an 
agreement among parties, meaning that the case does not requires a judge’s final decision. If correct, we can 
expect that increasing of the threshold of non-appealable cases, as LOG does after 2010, will reduce the 
resolved cases with Judge’s decision.   
 
 
Model 2 focuses on FICs to test the hypothetical impact of litigiousness, i.e. whether the increased threshold 
of non-appealable cases was able to decrease the litigiousness among parties and thus increase court 
performance. In this sense, it also tests whether adherence to federal legislation will decrease litigiousness 
and thus will increase court efficiency. Indeed, the main analysis suggests that any case requiring a judge to 
make a final Judge’s decision can decrease court efficiency and, as such, the court’s clearance rate.  
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Three sub-models are proposed: considering all FICs but Lugano (Mod. 2.A), considering all sections of the 
FICs of Lugano (Mod. 2.B) and considering all judges, which means all FICs and sections together (Mod. 
2.C). In other words, considering each single judge of the cantonal system, this analysis seeks to estimate 
whether litigiousness affects judicial efficiency. The proxy for litigiousness is the possibility of proposing an 
appeal at the second instance courts. Model 2 is as follows: 
 
Resolved_casesi,t = β0 + β1 Workload_non-appealablei,t + β2 Workload_appealablei,t + β3 Personneli,t + εi,t 
 
in which i represents the i-th FIC of Ticino at the year t, while ε the error. 
 
 
Table 9. Multiple regression model involving panel data, random effect, and robust option, 2001–2010 
 
 Mod. 2A Mod. 2B Mod. 2C 
Variables 
Resolved cases 
by Judge’s decision† 
Resolved cases 
by Judge’s decision† 
Resolved cases 
by Judge’s decision† 
    
Workload (appealable cases) 0.213 (0.178) 0.183*** (0.0693) 0.228*** (0.0685) 
Workload (non-appealable cases) -0.624** (0.308) -0.595*** (0.162) -0.835*** (0.140) 
Personnel (every 1,000 cases of workload) -0.00283* (0.00165) -0.0247*** (0.00584) -0.0125*** (0.00406) 
Constant 0.561*** (0.0871) 0.710*** (0.0222) 0.656*** (0.0416) 
    
R2    
Within  0.1055 0.6836 0.3502 
Between  0.2580 0.6295 0.6235 
Overall  0.1295 0.6195 0.4905 
    
Wald test (3)  5193.61 1353.56 2141.78 
Probability > chi-square  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
    
Observations 90 60 150 
Number of judges 9 6 15 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
† percentage of cases defined by Judge’s decision out of the total number of cases resolved by the judge 
 
Table 9 shows the results of Model 2, which is statistically significant (Wald test) and has a very high R
2
. 
Considering the between R
2
, the variance of the dependent variable explained by the model is 25.80 % in the 
model 2.A, and it raises more than 62 % in the model 2.B and 2.C. In both cases, the extremely high R
2
 
depends upon the sections of the FIC of Lugano, which is clearly due to the reallocation of workload among 
the sections (i.e. high level of heterogeneity among sections).  
 
Model 2’s results suggest that, by increasing the percentage of appealable cases in the total workload, the 
percentage of cases resolved by Judge’s decision will increase (p < 0.01). By contrast, decreasing the 
percentage of non-appealable cases in the total workload decreases the percentage of cases resolved by 
Judge’s decision, meaning that the percentage of cases resolved by other means will increase (p < 0.01). 
According to these results, the opportunity to propose an appeal increases litigiousness and, in turn, judicial 
inefficiency in Ticino’s courts by increasing the time needed to resolve cases. 
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5. Results and discussion  
 
Table 10 summarises our results. They indicate that an increasing of executions and bankruptcies in respect 
to the total workload reduces the clearance rate, though it has no significant effects on disposition time. The 
same first result occurs if we consider the number of cases resolved by Judge’s decision out of the total 
number of concluded cases, though this variable also positively affects disposition time. As such, cases 
resolved by Judge’s decision require more time than cases resolved by alternative means and, in turn, 
decrease court productivity.  
 
Considering personnel (i.e. judges and staff), literature shows a theoretical negative impact on clearance rate 
if we decrease the workload (Beenstock and Haitovsky, 2004). This result suggests that decreasing the 
pressure on judges’s workload—which might represent the labour pressure put on judges without an 
appropriate incentive system to maximise their activity— can also diminishing their productivity. That is, for 
the same workload, judges complete more cases under pressure, yet complete fewer cases when new judges 
are appointed. It should also be noted that the number of judges and staff do not significantly impact on 
disposition time. 
 
Finally, LexPP had a negative and statistically significant impact on clearance rate, which indicates the 
negative impact of the law on court performance. If we consider disposition time as a measure of judicial 
efficiency, then there is no significant effect on court performance.   
 
 
Table 10. Results of our empirical model (expected and estimated impact on court performance) 
 
Variables Effect on Court Performances 
Executions and bankruptcy cases 
Decreases clearance rate (negative effect on court efficiency);  
Irrelevant to disposition time* 
Resolved cases with Judge’s decisions 
Decreases clearance rate (negative effect on court efficiency); 
Increases disposition time (negative effect on court efficiency) 
Personnel  
Decreases clearance rate (negative effect on court efficiency); 
Irrelevant to disposition time* 
Workload 
Decreases clearance rate (negative effect on court efficiency); 
Irrelevant to disposition time* 
LexPP 
Decreases clearance rate (negative effect on courts’ efficiency); 
Irrelevant to disposition time* 
Threshold for non-appealable cases (LOG) 
Decreases the percentage of cases resolved by Judge’s decision (i.e., the litigiousness 
of parties), that is, expected positive effect on court efficiency 
Threshold for judges of peace (LOG) Decreases the workload, that is, expected negative effect on court efficiency 
*p > 0.1; see Section 4 for the empirical model. 
 
Our results offer also some suggestions on the expected impact of the LOG. We can affirm that the 
opportunity to propose an appeal against the judge’s decision can increase the parties’ propensity to litigate 
instead of reaching an agreement. In this sense, the possibility of proposing an appeal at a second instance 
court might preclude any (amicable) agreement among parties and require a final decision to be made by a 
judge, which increases the time necessary to define the case. In effect, increasing of threshold of non-
appealable cases (as introduced by LOG, in order to align cantonal regulation with federal regulations, such 
as those posed by the Swiss CPC) might decrease the time that Ticino’s courts require to process cases and, 
in this way, increase court efficiency.  
 
Nonetheless, the LOG increased both the threshold of judges of peace and the number of judges (Pretore 
aggiunto). It could imply a lower level of pressure on each judge in the FICs. Hence, without an appropriate 
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incentive system on judges, the positive impact deriving from new threshold of non-appealable cases may be 
not sufficient to produce a significant positive impact to the courts performance since judges effort could be 
negatively affected by the decrease of the workload. A preliminary evidence can be derived from data which 
are available only at cantonal level after 2010 (i.e. aggregate data). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Trend of the cantonal clearance rate in Ticino (2001-2012) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Trend of the cantonal disposition time in Ticino (2001-2012) 
 
The impact both in the case of clearance rate and of disposition time seems to be positive as well showed by 
figures 3 and 4.13 However, the aggregate clearance rate decreased dramatically after the year 2011. Could 
such diminishing of clearance rate derive from a reduction of pressure on judicial staff? Further researches 
and data should analyze such circumstance.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Note that in figures 3 and 4 we refer to aggregate clearance rate and aggregate disposition time of Canton Ticino instead of the 
average of cantonal FICs, which have been proposed in the tables 3 and 4. 
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6. Policy implications 
 
The results of this study suggest that LexPP has negatively affected court efficiency, even if it was able to 
decrease the workload of the most visited courts and, in turn, to increase judges’ availability. As such, the 
policy aimed at establishing that pretore of the smallest FICS must also work in the Tribunale Penale did not 
succeed.  
 
Moreover, findings of this study indicate that changing the threshold of non-appealable cases as pushed by 
the Swiss CPC and as introduced by LOG might decrease the propensity of parties to seek decisions by the 
courts, provided that there is not the possibility to appeal. In line with the current literature (Bianco et al., 
2007; CEPEJ, 2012), the study can support the hypothesis that litigiousness might be one of the determinants 
of judicial inefficiency, creating costs, not only for the disputing parties, but also for society as a whole. 
Trials tie up tangible and scarce social resources, such as the time of the parties, their lawyers, their judges, 
and their witnesses, to name a few.  
 
In order to improve the efficiency of the cantonal judicial system this work may suggest the following 
proposals. A first suggestion is that Ticino strongly facilitates alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
procedures. Even if court proceedings are the traditional means used by legal systems for settling disputes 
and have developed into their current form over many centuries, disputes need not be settled in court only. 
ADR procedures (e.g., mediation) coexist alongside statutory rules regarding the settlement of disputes. To 
reduce litigiousness, lawmakers might regulate lawyer fees (Ippoliti, 2014) and/or court fees in order to 
stimulate ADRs and discourage appeals, since research has shown that these fees could be linked to ADRs 
(Bernstein, 1993; Shavell, 1995).  
 
Since court fees might reduce the public expense by passing part of judicial costs to the market (Esposito et 
al., 2014), a better balanced distribution of litigation costs between taxpayers and the market might reduce 
the inflow of cases. The application of similar courts fees has increased throughout Europe in the last years, 
in the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and France, among others (Faure, 2006; Hodges et al., 2010; CEPEJ, 
2012).  
 
Nevertheless, the reduction of the workload by higher fees is not a sufficient solution if an appropriate 
incentive system for judges and staff is not in place. The literature shows that an appropriate motivation 
system should be developed by the policymaker (Cooter, 1983; Deyneli, 2012; Posner, 1993).  
 
A further implication of our results is that executions and bankruptcy cases, even if they are significantly 
shorter, they reduce the performance of cantonal courts in terms of clearance rate. Further studies should thus 
focus on executions and bankruptcy procedures and the level of personnel and specialization of judges. For 
instance, since the specialisation of a magistrate in a specific topic might increase judges’ productivity 
(Marchesi, 2003), a specific FIC with a competence for executions and bankruptcies might increase cantonal 
efficiency (e.g., pretori aggiunti might work in such a court). A more in-depth analysis of the fifth section of 
the FIC of Lugano, which retains personnel dedicated to bankruptcies and executions, might produce insights 
for further studies, as well as guide policymakers in making future reforms. 
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